Bitcoin Mining Is Big in China. Why Investors Should Worry.
Why the digital currency’s dependence on China, specifically Xinjiang, is concerning.
Why the digital currency’s dependence on China, specifically Xinjiang, is concerning.
Critics of the nearly ubiquitous digital currency Bitcoin often focus on its environmental consequences. After Tesla announced recently that it had bought roughly US$1.5 billion in Bitcoin, sending the cryptocurrency’s value skyrocketing, sustainability investors decried the “level of carbon dioxide emissions generated from Bitcoin mining.” Certainly, “mining”—the energy-intensive process by which computers solve complex algorithmic problems to verify blockchain transactions, for which they’re rewarded in digital currency—is an undeniable environmental offender.
But there is another worrying aspect of Bitcoin, one that should make investors think twice about including it as part of an ethical investing strategy.
A large amount of new Bitcoin comes from Xinjiang, the region in northwest China where more than a million Uighur Muslims and other minorities have been imprisoned in concentration camps. According to the Cambridge Bitcoin Electricity Consumption Index, as of April 2020, China was responsible for 65% of all Bitcoin mining. And of that, 36% takes place in Xinjiang, the largest regional component. Why? Cheap coal means cheap energy to power the machines that mine Bitcoin. Xinjiang has an abundant supply of coal, and the region’s relative remoteness means that it’s far cheaper to use the resource locally than move it to other parts of China. The issue is not that the Chinese government uses forced labour in Xinjiang coal mines—the reporting on that is inconclusive. Rather, because of the atrocities occurring in Xinjiang, any product produced there brings with it high ethical and regulatory risk.
In the camps—which Beijing calls “vocational educational and training centres”—guards try to “deradicalise” Uighurs for crimes such as wearing long dresses, abstaining from pork or alcohol, or praying. While the difficulty of reporting in the region means that concrete evidence is scarce, camp survivors have described systemic torture, forced sterilization, and rape. (Beijing denies committing atrocities.) In January, right before leaving office, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo declared that Beijing was committing “genocide” in the region. His successor, Antony Blinken, agrees.
To summarize: Roughly 20% of new Bitcoin is mined in Xinjiang, the site of some of the world’s most egregious human-rights abuses.
Today, Bitcoin’s association with Xinjiang is barely discussed. But that may change. For public-facing funds considering investing in the notoriously volatile asset, there are two other risks to consider. The first is that because of the concern among the American public about human-rights abuses in Xinjiang, holding assets tied to the region comes at the risk of a public relations disaster.
Already, activists have criticised Olympic sponsors for participating in the “genocide Olympics”—the 2022 Beijing Winter Games. Multiyear campaigns to hive Xinjiang off from the global supply chain are already well under way.
In July, more than 190 organizations, including the AFL-CIO, called for clothing brands to end all sourcing from Xinjiang within the next 12 months. (In 2020, roughly 20% of the world’s cotton came from Xinjiang.) It’s not hard to imagine Bitcoin becoming another frontier in their campaigns.
Investors should be alert for regulatory action. Bitcoin’s Xinjiang relationship gives ammunition to those in the U.S. government who may want to further monitor or restrict the transactions. Analysts expect the Biden administration to pay close attention to Bitcoin. In mid-February, Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen criticised the “misuse” of cryptocurrencies in laundering money or funding terrorism. At the same time, Bitcoin’s Xinjiang connection could put it on the radar of the various arms of the Commerce, State, and Defense departments that are seeking to reduce U.S. dependence on physical and digital Chinese goods. If this trend intensifies, the Treasury Department could sanction the Bitcoin mining firms that have large operations in Xinjiang, or issue advisories that it is “studying” Bitcoin’s links to the region—signalling to global financial institutions another risk of holding the cryptocurrency.
In January, U.S. Customs banned the imports of Xinjiang cotton and tomato products and told U.S. companies to get forced labour out of their supply chains. Extricating Bitcoin from Xinjiang could be far more difficult. Unlike, say, blood diamonds or Iranian crude oil, Bitcoins exist only digitally. While there is a public record of the billions of Bitcoin transactions, it’s exceedingly complicated to determine the geographic origin of a particular Bitcoin. That means all Bitcoin holders can deny any connection to human-rights abuses—but also risk being tarnished by the association.
It has long been ironic that Bitcoin, developed to decentralize power, is so dependent on China, a country ruled by a government obsessed with centralizing it. But depending on China is one thing. Depending on Xinjiang is another. There are many excellent ethical and regulatory reasons not to buy Bitcoin. Add Xinjiang to that list.
Isaac Stone Fish is the CEO and founder of Strategy Risks, a firm that quantifies corporate exposure to China.>
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Multinationals like Starbucks and Marriott are taking a hard look at their Chinese operations—and tempering their outlooks.
For years, global companies showcased their Chinese operations as a source of robust growth. A burgeoning middle class, a stream of people moving to cities, and the creation of new services to cater to them—along with the promise of the further opening of the world’s second-largest economy—drew companies eager to tap into the action.
Then Covid hit, isolating China from much of the world. Chinese leader Xi Jinping tightened control of the economy, and U.S.-China relations hit a nadir. After decades of rapid growth, China’s economy is stuck in a rut, with increasing concerns about what will drive the next phase of its growth.
Though Chinese officials have acknowledged the sputtering economy, they have been reluctant to take more than incremental steps to reverse the trend. Making matters worse, government crackdowns on internet companies and measures to burst the country’s property bubble left households and businesses scarred.
Now, multinational companies are taking a hard look at their Chinese operations and tempering their outlooks. Marriott International narrowed its global revenue per available room growth rate to 3% to 4%, citing continued weakness in China and expectations that demand could weaken further in the third quarter. Paris-based Kering , home to brands Gucci and Saint Laurent, posted a 22% decline in sales in the Asia-Pacific region, excluding Japan, in the first half amid weaker demand in Greater China, which includes Hong Kong and Macau.
Pricing pressure and deflation were common themes in quarterly results. Starbucks , which helped build a coffee culture in China over the past 25 years, described it as one of its most notable international challenges as it posted a 14% decline in sales from that business. As Chinese consumers reconsidered whether to spend money on Starbucks lattes, competitors such as Luckin Coffee increased pressure on the Seattle company. Starbucks executives said in their quarterly earnings call that “unprecedented store expansion” by rivals and a price war hurt profits and caused “significant disruptions” to the operating environment.
Executive anxiety extends beyond consumer companies. Elevator maker Otis Worldwide saw new-equipment orders in China fall by double digits in the second quarter, forcing it to cut its outlook for growth out of Asia. CEO Judy Marks told analysts on a quarterly earnings call that prices in China were down roughly 10% year over year, and she doesn’t see the pricing pressure abating. The company is turning to productivity improvements and cost cutting to blunt the hit.
Add in the uncertainty created by deteriorating U.S.-China relations, and many investors are steering clear. The iShares MSCI China exchange-traded fund has lost half its value since March 2021. Recovery attempts have been short-lived. undefined undefined And now some of those concerns are creeping into the U.S. market. “A decade ago China exposure [for a global company] was a way to add revenue growth to our portfolio,” says Margaret Vitrano, co-manager of large-cap growth strategies at ClearBridge Investments in New York. Today, she notes, “we now want to manage the risk of the China exposure.”
Vitrano expects improvement in 2025, but cautions it will be slow. Uncertainty over who will win the U.S. presidential election and the prospect of higher tariffs pose additional risks for global companies.
For now, China is inching along at roughly 5% economic growth—down from a peak of 14% in 2007 and an average of about 8% in the 10 years before the pandemic. Chinese consumers hit by job losses and continued declines in property values are rethinking spending habits. Businesses worried about policy uncertainty are reluctant to invest and hire.
The trouble goes beyond frugal consumers. Xi is changing the economy’s growth model, relying less on the infrastructure and real estate market that fueled earlier growth. That means investing aggressively in manufacturing and exports as China looks to become more self-reliant and guard against geopolitical tensions.
The shift is hurting western multinationals, with deflationary forces amid burgeoning production capacity. “We have seen the investment community mark down expectations for these companies because they will have to change tack with lower-cost products and services,” says Joseph Quinlan, head of market strategy for the chief investment office at Merrill and Bank of America Private Bank.
Another challenge for multinationals outside of China is stiffened competition as Chinese companies innovate and expand—often with the backing of the government. Local rivals are upping the ante across sectors by building on their knowledge of local consumer preferences and the ability to produce higher-quality products.
Some global multinationals are having a hard time keeping up with homegrown innovation. Auto makers including General Motors have seen sales tumble and struggled to turn profitable as Chinese car shoppers increasingly opt for electric vehicles from BYD or NIO that are similar in price to internal-combustion-engine cars from foreign auto makers.
“China’s electric-vehicle makers have by leaps and bounds surpassed the capabilities of foreign brands who have a tie to the profit pool of internal combustible engines that they don’t want to disrupt,” says Christine Phillpotts, a fund manager for Ariel Investments’ emerging markets strategies.
Chinese companies are often faster than global rivals to market with new products or tweaks. “The cycle can be half of what it is for a global multinational with subsidiaries that need to check with headquarters, do an analysis, and then refresh,” Phillpotts says.
For many companies and investors, next year remains a question mark. Ashland CEO Guillermo Novo said in an August call with analysts that the chemical company was seeing a “big change” in China, with activity slowing and competition on pricing becoming more aggressive. The company, he said, was still trying to grasp the repercussions as it has created uncertainty in its 2025 outlook.
Few companies are giving up. Executives at big global consumer and retail companies show no signs of reducing investment, with most still describing China as a long-term growth market, says Dana Telsey, CEO of Telsey Advisory Group.
Starbucks executives described the long-term opportunity as “significant,” with higher growth and margin opportunities in the future as China’s population continues to move from rural to suburban areas. But they also noted that their approach is evolving and they are in the early stages of exploring strategic partnerships.
Walmart sold its stake in August in Chinese e-commerce giant JD.com for $3.6 billion after an eight-year noncompete agreement expired. Analysts expect it to pump the money into its own Sam’s Club and Walmart China operation, which have benefited from the trend toward trading down in China.
“The story isn’t over for the global companies,” Phillpotts says. “It just means the effort and investment will be greater to compete.”
Corrections & Amplifications
Joseph Quinlan is head of market strategy for the chief investment office at Merrill and Bank of America Private Bank. An earlier version of this article incorrectly used his old title.