An Italian investigation is shining a harsh light on the supply chain of luxury brands
3 min
Christian Dior struck gold when it found a supplier willing to assemble a €2,600 handbag, equivalent to around $2,816, for just €53 a piece—or did it? Cleaning up the reputational damage may not come cheap.
A Milan court named LVMH -owned Dior and Giorgio Armani as two brands whose products were made in sweatshop-like conditions in Italy. Images of an unkempt facility where designer handbags were produced, which was raided as part of an investigation into Italy’s fashion supply chain , are worlds apart from those the luxury industry likes to show its customers.
To keep up with the strong demand for their goods, some high-end brands rely on independent workshops to supplement their in-house factories. Sales at LVMH’s leather goods division have almost doubled since 2019.
While more outsourced manufacturing is understandable in a boom, brands may also have taken cost-saving measures too far in a push to juice profits. Some of Dior’s production was contracted out directly to a Chinese-run factory in Italy, where workers assembled the bags in unsafe conditions, according to a translated court order. In other instances, Dior’s suppliers subcontracted work out to low-cost factories that also used irregular labour.
Nipping the problem in the bud would require hundreds of millions of dollars worth of investment in new facilities to bring more manufacturing in-house. The alternative is for Dior to pay its suppliers more and keep them on a tighter leash. Either way, the result seems likely to be lower profits than shareholders have grown accustomed to.
Top luxury brands such as Christian Dior can have very high margins because consumers are willing to pay steep prices for goods they see as status symbols. They also can spread high fixed costs, such as expensive advertising campaigns over a large volume of sales.
For the LVMH group overall, the cost of making the products it sells—everything from Champagne to watches to cosmetics—amounted to 31% of sales in 2023. But the margins on big-brand handbags are probably at the high end of the spectrum.
Bernstein analyst Luca Solca estimates that a €10 billion luxury fashion label, roughly Dior’s size, may spend just 23% of its sales on the raw materials and labour that go into its products. This implies a €2,600 Dior purse would cost €598 to make, equivalent to $647 for a roughly $2,800 product at current exchange rates.
In reality, the cost may be even lower, based on the results of the Italian investigation. The €53-a-piece assembly price it cited, equivalent to around $57, didn’t include the cost of the leather and hardware, but that would add only another €150 or so, according to one Italian supplier.
Advertising fees are a further €156 per handbag, according to Bernstein’s analysis, and depreciation of the company’s assets is €156. Running the brand’s stores—including paying the rent on some of the most exclusive shopping streets in the world—and head-office costs come to an additional €390. This leaves €1,300 of pure operating profit for Dior, or a 50% margin.
“This is the reality of the business,” says Solca. “The retail price for the goods of major luxury brands is typically between eight and 12 times the cost of making the product.”
LVMH hasn’t commented on the investigation, which first made headlines nearly a month ago. Meanwhile, a public-relations storm is brewing. Luxury influencers on social media are asking what exactly people are paying for when they shell out for a fancy purse. Recent price increases also make the cheap manufacturing costs hard to stomach. A mini Lady Dior bag that cost $3,500 in 2019 will set shoppers back $5,500 today, a 57% increase.
A dozen other luxury labels that remain unnamed are under investigation for similar issues in their Italian supply chains, so this may be a much wider problem.
Profits will take a hit if the industry decides to clean up its act. But the cost of doing nothing might be higher. Luxury brands that charge customers thousands of dollars and rely on a reputation for quality can’t afford to be cheap.
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Multinationals like Starbucks and Marriott are taking a hard look at their Chinese operations—and tempering their outlooks.
4 min
For years, global companies showcased their Chinese operations as a source of robust growth. A burgeoning middle class, a stream of people moving to cities, and the creation of new services to cater to them—along with the promise of the further opening of the world’s second-largest economy—drew companies eager to tap into the action.
Then Covid hit, isolating China from much of the world. Chinese leader Xi Jinping tightened control of the economy, and U.S.-China relations hit a nadir. After decades of rapid growth, China’s economy is stuck in a rut, with increasing concerns about what will drive the next phase of its growth.
Though Chinese officials have acknowledged the sputtering economy, they have been reluctant to take more than incremental steps to reverse the trend. Making matters worse, government crackdowns on internet companies and measures to burst the country’s property bubble left households and businesses scarred.
Now, multinational companies are taking a hard look at their Chinese operations and tempering their outlooks. Marriott International narrowed its global revenue per available room growth rate to 3% to 4%, citing continued weakness in China and expectations that demand could weaken further in the third quarter. Paris-based Kering , home to brands Gucci and Saint Laurent, posted a 22% decline in sales in the Asia-Pacific region, excluding Japan, in the first half amid weaker demand in Greater China, which includes Hong Kong and Macau.
Pricing pressure and deflation were common themes in quarterly results. Starbucks , which helped build a coffee culture in China over the past 25 years, described it as one of its most notable international challenges as it posted a 14% decline in sales from that business. As Chinese consumers reconsidered whether to spend money on Starbucks lattes, competitors such as Luckin Coffee increased pressure on the Seattle company. Starbucks executives said in their quarterly earnings call that “unprecedented store expansion” by rivals and a price war hurt profits and caused “significant disruptions” to the operating environment.
Executive anxiety extends beyond consumer companies. Elevator maker Otis Worldwide saw new-equipment orders in China fall by double digits in the second quarter, forcing it to cut its outlook for growth out of Asia. CEO Judy Marks told analysts on a quarterly earnings call that prices in China were down roughly 10% year over year, and she doesn’t see the pricing pressure abating. The company is turning to productivity improvements and cost cutting to blunt the hit.
Add in the uncertainty created by deteriorating U.S.-China relations, and many investors are steering clear. The iShares MSCI China exchange-traded fund has lost half its value since March 2021. Recovery attempts have been short-lived. undefined undefined And now some of those concerns are creeping into the U.S. market. “A decade ago China exposure [for a global company] was a way to add revenue growth to our portfolio,” says Margaret Vitrano, co-manager of large-cap growth strategies at ClearBridge Investments in New York. Today, she notes, “we now want to manage the risk of the China exposure.”
Vitrano expects improvement in 2025, but cautions it will be slow. Uncertainty over who will win the U.S. presidential election and the prospect of higher tariffs pose additional risks for global companies.
For now, China is inching along at roughly 5% economic growth—down from a peak of 14% in 2007 and an average of about 8% in the 10 years before the pandemic. Chinese consumers hit by job losses and continued declines in property values are rethinking spending habits. Businesses worried about policy uncertainty are reluctant to invest and hire.
The trouble goes beyond frugal consumers. Xi is changing the economy’s growth model, relying less on the infrastructure and real estate market that fueled earlier growth. That means investing aggressively in manufacturing and exports as China looks to become more self-reliant and guard against geopolitical tensions.
The shift is hurting western multinationals, with deflationary forces amid burgeoning production capacity. “We have seen the investment community mark down expectations for these companies because they will have to change tack with lower-cost products and services,” says Joseph Quinlan, head of market strategy for the chief investment office at Merrill and Bank of America Private Bank.
Another challenge for multinationals outside of China is stiffened competition as Chinese companies innovate and expand—often with the backing of the government. Local rivals are upping the ante across sectors by building on their knowledge of local consumer preferences and the ability to produce higher-quality products.
Some global multinationals are having a hard time keeping up with homegrown innovation. Auto makers including General Motors have seen sales tumble and struggled to turn profitable as Chinese car shoppers increasingly opt for electric vehicles from BYD or NIO that are similar in price to internal-combustion-engine cars from foreign auto makers.
“China’s electric-vehicle makers have by leaps and bounds surpassed the capabilities of foreign brands who have a tie to the profit pool of internal combustible engines that they don’t want to disrupt,” says Christine Phillpotts, a fund manager for Ariel Investments’ emerging markets strategies.
Chinese companies are often faster than global rivals to market with new products or tweaks. “The cycle can be half of what it is for a global multinational with subsidiaries that need to check with headquarters, do an analysis, and then refresh,” Phillpotts says.
For many companies and investors, next year remains a question mark. Ashland CEO Guillermo Novo said in an August call with analysts that the chemical company was seeing a “big change” in China, with activity slowing and competition on pricing becoming more aggressive. The company, he said, was still trying to grasp the repercussions as it has created uncertainty in its 2025 outlook.
Few companies are giving up. Executives at big global consumer and retail companies show no signs of reducing investment, with most still describing China as a long-term growth market, says Dana Telsey, CEO of Telsey Advisory Group.
Starbucks executives described the long-term opportunity as “significant,” with higher growth and margin opportunities in the future as China’s population continues to move from rural to suburban areas. But they also noted that their approach is evolving and they are in the early stages of exploring strategic partnerships.
Walmart sold its stake in August in Chinese e-commerce giant JD.com for $3.6 billion after an eight-year noncompete agreement expired. Analysts expect it to pump the money into its own Sam’s Club and Walmart China operation, which have benefited from the trend toward trading down in China.
“The story isn’t over for the global companies,” Phillpotts says. “It just means the effort and investment will be greater to compete.”
Corrections & Amplifications
Joseph Quinlan is head of market strategy for the chief investment office at Merrill and Bank of America Private Bank. An earlier version of this article incorrectly used his old title.
