In France, Investors Get the Centrist Limbo They Wanted - Kanebridge News
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In France, Investors Get the Centrist Limbo They Wanted

Polarisation has for years left the country’s politics stuck in an unpopular middle ground, and the latest elections won’t change that

By JON SINDREU
Wed, Jul 10, 2024 9:42amGrey Clock 2 min

When it comes to France’s turbulent politics , the current impasse is probably the best investors could have hoped for.

The second round of French legislative elections delivered a widely expected hung parliament, but not its predicted makeup: Rather than coming in first, Marine Le Pen ’s far-right and anti-immigrant National Rally finished third. In a shock twist , the leftist New Popular Front alliance emerged victorious, with the party of President Emmanuel Macron and its allies in second place.

This is because leftists and centrists ended up coordinating. In many local races, candidates dropped out to avoid dividing the vote against the far right. Still, no party has an outright majority, which plunges the country into political gridlock. This was, counterintuitively, the preferred outcome for financial markets.

The CAC 40 initially tumbled when the elections were called in June, driven by fears of a potential National Rally government challenging the European Union with fiscally expansive plans. Then the French stock benchmark perked up, as the first-round results suggested that the far-right wouldn’t get a majority.

Yet markets remained volatile because the rise of the New Popular Front raised even greater concerns. The policies of this coalition, in which leftist firebrand Jean-Luc Mélenchon is a key leader, also include more public spending, on top of widespread tax increases. Indeed, the CAC 40 closed down 0.6% Monday, probably reflecting investors’ concerns about these parties potentially managing to form a new government. Mélenchon has stated that there will be no deals with the centrists.

These worries seem overblown. Yes, there are doubts about how France will handle its budget deficit, which amounted to 5.5% of gross domestic product in 2023 and has forced the EU to launch an “excessive deficit procedure” against the country. Macron may need to accept the reversal of reforms such as a higher retirement age.

Still, a fiscal crisis isn’t in the cards, because the European Central Bank is ultimately in control of France’s bond market.

As for economic growth, it is unclear how much impact Macron’s policies have had in the first place, particularly given resistance from unions and swaths of the public, which resulted in the famous “yellow vest” protests in 2018 and 2020.

What matters for sectors battered in the stock market, including banks, energy firms and infrastructure operators, is that the risk of widespread tax increases, nationalisations and a prolonged standoff with Brussels seems smaller now than a few weeks ago. Whatever Mélenchon says, the left will either have to compromise or else form a minority government that might scare investors but wouldn’t be able to pass laws.

So there isn’t much justification for the lower valuation of lenders such as Société Générale and especially BNP Paribas —one of Europe’s most interesting banks that now trades at 0.65 times tangible book value. The same is likely true for firms such as energy utility Engie and infrastructure-concessions leader Vinci , which have lost 8% of their market value since the end of May.

These elections are more a symptom of Macron’s weakness than its cause. After a chaotic month, French politics is back where it has been for years, with a rising far right forcing the left to back a centrist platform that can achieve little because few people actually like it. Macron himself became president on an anti-Le Pen ticket, but in seven years has failed to rally broad support for his pro-business vision.

This could eventually make Le Pen’s victory inevitable, as she claimed after initial results came in. For now, though, it is more or less what markets ordered.



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Growth in size of U.S. market gives him extra leverage in trade negotiations with other countries

By JOSH MITCHELL
Thu, Nov 14, 2024 3 min

Donald Trump will retake office in a global economy substantially transformed from eight years ago—one much more reliant on the U.S.

It means that the president-elect’s plans, including across the board tariffs, could pack an even greater wallop on other countries than the first round of “America First” economic policy. It also gives Trump much more leverage in negotiations over trade policy.

Strong growth since the pandemic has expanded the U.S.’s weight in the global economy. Its share of output among the Group of Seven wealthy nations is higher than at any point since at least the 1980s, International Monetary Fund data shows.

Growth in China, the world’s second-largest economy, has slowed. Germany, the largest European economy, is contracting. Many poorer economies are buckling under the weight of high debt.

U.S. gains in global output partly reflect the strong dollar, which pushes up the value of American output relative to that of foreign economies. But they also result from substantial increases in U.S. productivity compared with the rest of the world.

The changes in the global economy have made America, not China, the premier destination for foreign direct investment, enlarging the exposure that foreign companies have to the U.S. economy and changes in government policy. A booming U.S. stock market has attracted huge flows of investment dollars.

“The fact that much of the rest of the world is now struggling to generate demand on its own provides more reason for countries to try to reach some sort of accommodation with Trump,” said Brad Setser , a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations.

Trump started imposing tariffs in 2018, primarily on China but also on Europe and other allies. Those tariffs fractured global trade, weighing on large exporting economies in Asia and Europe, while not obviously hurting the U.S., which is less reliant on foreign demand than its trading partners. Trump campaigned on a promise to impose at least a 60% tariff on China, and an across the board tariff of 10% to 20% on everywhere else.

America’s superior economic performance has been driven in part by energy independence and massive government spending, said Neil Shearing , chief economist at Capital Economics in London. Since the U.S. now exports more energy than it imports—including millions of barrels of oil each month to China—the nation as a whole benefits when energy prices rise, unlike for net importers such as China and Europe.

The upshot: America’s traditional role as the centre of gravity in the global economy has become even more pronounced in the years after Trump’s first-term tariffs, the pandemic, and Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine.

U.S. influence over Europe’s economy is a case in point. The U.S. has cemented its position as Europe’s largest export market as trans-Atlantic trade surged in recent years and China’s imports from Europe stalled. The U.S. has replaced Russia as Europe’s major source of imported energy. Europe runs big trade surpluses with the U.S. but big trade deficits with China.

The result is access to the U.S. market is far more important for Europe than access to European markets for the U.S. That asymmetry will give Trump leverage in trade negotiations with Europe, according to economists.

Germany exports around 7% of its entire manufacturing value-added to the U.S., but Germany imports only around 0.8% of value-added in U.S. manufacturing, according to a September paper by researchers at Germany’s Ifo Institute for Economic Research.

“German business is vulnerable to Trump,” said Marcel Fratzscher , president of the Berlin-based economic research institute DIW Berlin.

Parts of Asia have benefited from the changes in supply chains sparked by Trump’s initial trade war with China. Many manufacturers, including Chinese ones, moved factories to places such as Vietnam and Cambodia. For the past two quarters, Southeast Asia’s exports to the U.S. have exceeded those to China.

But that now leaves them more exposed to across the board tariffs, a policy that Trump advisers say will be necessary to force manufacturing back to the U.S.

To be sure, Trump’s policies could create countervailing forces. Tariffs would decrease imports and potentially weigh on productivity, but tax cuts would drive up household and business spending, including, inevitably, on imports. Other countries could retaliate by placing tariffs on U.S. goods.

Meanwhile, a tight U.S. labor market has pushed up wages, which is good for those workers. But it could pressure employers to raise prices, in turn making them vulnerable to foreign competition.

Many economists are girding for a different type of trade war from Trump 1.0, when trade fell between the U.S. and China but was diverted elsewhere.

“As long as protectionism refers only to one country, China, the world can live with this,” said Joerg Kraemer , chief economist at Commerzbank. “The thing becomes difficult or dangerous if you implement tariffs on all countries. This would be a new era in global trade.”