Impact investing is becoming more mainstream as larger, institutional asset owners drive more money into the sector, according to the nonprofit Global Impact Investing Network in New York.
In the GIIN’s State of the Market 2024 report, published late last month, researchers found that assets allocated to impact-investing strategies by repeat survey responders grew by a compound annual growth rate (CAGR) of 14% over the last five years.
These 71 responders to both the 2019 and 2024 surveys saw their total impact assets under management grow to US$249 billion this year from US$129 billion five years ago.
Medium- and large-size investors were largely responsible for the strong impact returns: Medium-size investors posted a median CAGR of 11% a year over the five-year period, and large-size investors posted a median CAGR of 14% a year.
Interestingly, the CAGR of assets held by small investors dropped by a median of 14% a year.
“When we drill down behind the compound annual growth of the assets that are being allocated to impact investing, it’s largely those larger investors that are actually driving it,” says Dean Hand, the GIIN’s chief research officer.
Overall, the GIIN surveyed 305 investors with a combined US$490 billion under management from 39 countries. Nearly three-quarters of the responders were investment managers, while 10% were foundations, and 3% were family offices. Development finance institutions, institutional asset owners, and companies represented most of the rest.
The majority of impact strategies are executed through private-equity, but public debt and equity have been the fastest-growing asset classes over the past five years, the report said. Public debt is growing at a CAGR of 32%, and public equity is growing at a CAGR of 19%. That compares to a CAGR of 17% for private equity and 7% for private debt.
According to the GIIN, the rise in public impact assets is being driven by larger investors, likely institutions.
Private equity has traditionally served as an ideal way to execute impact strategies, as it allows investors to select vehicles specifically designed to create a positive social or environmental impact by, for example, providing loans to smallholder farmers in Africa or by supporting fledging renewable energy technologies.
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But today, institutional investors are looking across their portfolios—encompassing both private and public assets—to achieve their impact goals.
“Institutional asset owners are saying, ‘In the interests of our ultimate beneficiaries, we probably need to start driving these strategies across our assets,’” Hand says. Instead of carving out a dedicated impact strategy, these investors are taking “a holistic portfolio approach.”
An institutional manager may want to address issues such as climate change, healthcare costs, and local economic growth so it can support a better quality of life for its beneficiaries.
To achieve these goals, the manager could invest across a range of private debt, private equity, and real estate.
But the public markets offer opportunities, too. Using public debt, a manager could, for example, invest in green bonds, regional bank bonds, or healthcare social bonds. In public equity, it could invest in green-power storage technologies, minority-focused real-estate trusts, and in pharmaceutical and medical-care company stocks with the aim of influencing them to lower the costs of care, according to an example the GIIN lays out in a separate report on institutional strategies.
Influencing companies to act in the best interests of society and the environment is increasingly being done through such shareholder advocacy, either directly through ownership in individual stocks or through fund vehicles.
“They’re trying to move their portfolio companies to actually solving some of the challenges that exist,” Hand says.
Although the rate of growth in public strategies for impact is brisk, among survey respondents investments in public debt totalled only 12% of assets and just 7% in public equity. Private equity, however, grabs 43% of these investors’ assets.
Within private equity, Hand also discerns more evidence of maturity in the impact sector. That’s because more impact-oriented asset owners invest in mature and growth-stage companies, which are favoured by larger asset owners that have more substantial assets to put to work.
The GIIN State of the Market report also found that impact asset owners are largely happy with both the financial performance and impact results of their holdings.
About three-quarters of those surveyed were seeking risk-adjusted, market-rate returns, although foundations were an exception as 68% sought below-market returns, the report said. Overall, 86% reported their investments were performing in line or above their expectations—even when their targets were not met—and 90% said the same for their impact returns.
Private-equity posted the strongest results, returning 17% on average, although that was less than the 19% targeted return. By contrast, public equity returned 11%, above a 10% target.
The fact some asset classes over performed and others underperformed, shows that “normal economic forces are at play in the market,” Hand says.
Although investors are satisfied with their impact performance, they are still dealing with a fragmented approach for measuring it, the report said. “Despite this, over two-thirds of investors are incorporating impact criteria into their investment governance documents, signalling a significant shift toward formalising impact considerations in decision-making processes,” it said.
Also, more investors are getting third-party verification of their results, which strengthens their accountability in the market.
“The satisfaction with performance is nice to see,” Hand says. “But we do need to see more about what’s happening in terms of investors being able to actually track both the impact performance in real terms as well as the financial performance in real terms.”
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Growth in size of U.S. market gives him extra leverage in trade negotiations with other countries
Donald Trump will retake office in a global economy substantially transformed from eight years ago—one much more reliant on the U.S.
It means that the president-elect’s plans, including across the board tariffs, could pack an even greater wallop on other countries than the first round of “America First” economic policy. It also gives Trump much more leverage in negotiations over trade policy.
Strong growth since the pandemic has expanded the U.S.’s weight in the global economy. Its share of output among the Group of Seven wealthy nations is higher than at any point since at least the 1980s, International Monetary Fund data shows.
Growth in China, the world’s second-largest economy, has slowed. Germany, the largest European economy, is contracting. Many poorer economies are buckling under the weight of high debt.
U.S. gains in global output partly reflect the strong dollar, which pushes up the value of American output relative to that of foreign economies. But they also result from substantial increases in U.S. productivity compared with the rest of the world.
The changes in the global economy have made America, not China, the premier destination for foreign direct investment, enlarging the exposure that foreign companies have to the U.S. economy and changes in government policy. A booming U.S. stock market has attracted huge flows of investment dollars.
“The fact that much of the rest of the world is now struggling to generate demand on its own provides more reason for countries to try to reach some sort of accommodation with Trump,” said Brad Setser , a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations.
Trump started imposing tariffs in 2018, primarily on China but also on Europe and other allies. Those tariffs fractured global trade, weighing on large exporting economies in Asia and Europe, while not obviously hurting the U.S., which is less reliant on foreign demand than its trading partners. Trump campaigned on a promise to impose at least a 60% tariff on China, and an across the board tariff of 10% to 20% on everywhere else.
America’s superior economic performance has been driven in part by energy independence and massive government spending, said Neil Shearing , chief economist at Capital Economics in London. Since the U.S. now exports more energy than it imports—including millions of barrels of oil each month to China—the nation as a whole benefits when energy prices rise, unlike for net importers such as China and Europe.
The upshot: America’s traditional role as the centre of gravity in the global economy has become even more pronounced in the years after Trump’s first-term tariffs, the pandemic, and Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine.
U.S. influence over Europe’s economy is a case in point. The U.S. has cemented its position as Europe’s largest export market as trans-Atlantic trade surged in recent years and China’s imports from Europe stalled. The U.S. has replaced Russia as Europe’s major source of imported energy. Europe runs big trade surpluses with the U.S. but big trade deficits with China.
The result is access to the U.S. market is far more important for Europe than access to European markets for the U.S. That asymmetry will give Trump leverage in trade negotiations with Europe, according to economists.
Germany exports around 7% of its entire manufacturing value-added to the U.S., but Germany imports only around 0.8% of value-added in U.S. manufacturing, according to a September paper by researchers at Germany’s Ifo Institute for Economic Research.
“German business is vulnerable to Trump,” said Marcel Fratzscher , president of the Berlin-based economic research institute DIW Berlin.
Parts of Asia have benefited from the changes in supply chains sparked by Trump’s initial trade war with China. Many manufacturers, including Chinese ones, moved factories to places such as Vietnam and Cambodia. For the past two quarters, Southeast Asia’s exports to the U.S. have exceeded those to China.
But that now leaves them more exposed to across the board tariffs, a policy that Trump advisers say will be necessary to force manufacturing back to the U.S.
To be sure, Trump’s policies could create countervailing forces. Tariffs would decrease imports and potentially weigh on productivity, but tax cuts would drive up household and business spending, including, inevitably, on imports. Other countries could retaliate by placing tariffs on U.S. goods.
Meanwhile, a tight U.S. labor market has pushed up wages, which is good for those workers. But it could pressure employers to raise prices, in turn making them vulnerable to foreign competition.
Many economists are girding for a different type of trade war from Trump 1.0, when trade fell between the U.S. and China but was diverted elsewhere.
“As long as protectionism refers only to one country, China, the world can live with this,” said Joerg Kraemer , chief economist at Commerzbank. “The thing becomes difficult or dangerous if you implement tariffs on all countries. This would be a new era in global trade.”